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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG)' is an international treaty that estab-
lishes uniform rules to govern international commercial contracts
in order to remove "legal barriers in ... and promote the develop-
ment of international trade. 2 CISG was the successor to the 1964
Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods (ULIS),3 a result of over fifty years of international efforts
to create uniform rules of commercial law,4 or a lex mercatoria.5 In
1986, the United States became a party to the CISG, which went
into force in 1988.6 As a self-executing treaty,7 U.S. courts are
required to apply the CISG, where appropriate, to settle interna-
tional contract disputes rather than using the previously applica-
ble Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) rules of the various states.'
CISG article 74, as well as article 82 of ULIS, provides the
rules for calculating damages in cases of contract breach by one of
the contracting parties. Damages "consist of a sum equal to the
loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a conse-
1. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CISG], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf.
The CISG currently has sixty-six state parties. See Status: 1980 - United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/sale-goods/1980CISG status.html (last visited Jan. 1,
2007).
2. CISG, supra note 1, at Annex 1.
3. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods,
July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S 107, available at http://www.unidroit.org/englishl
conventions/c-ulis.htm [hereinafter ULIS].
4. See Michael Joachim Bonell, The Unidroit Principles of International
Commercial Contracts and CISG - Alternatives or Complementary Instruments?, 26
UNIFORM L. REV. 26-39 (1996).
5. Lex Mercatoria in English translates to law merchant, which is defined as "[a]
system of customary law that developed in Europe during the Middle Ages and
regulated the dealings of mariners and merchants in all the commercial countries of
the world until the 17th century." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)
6. Sarah Howard Jenkins, Evolving Sales Law: Highlights of the Shifting
Landscape of Arkansas Purchasing Law, 57 ARK. L. REV. 835 (2005) (citing JOHN 0.
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 3 (3d ed. 1999) ("The United
States ratified the Convention by December 11, 1986, with the [CISG] becoming
effective on January 1, 1988.").
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 (1987); see also JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 51-64 (1996) [hereinafter PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW].
8. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1933).
2007] QUE LASTIMA ZAPATA 407
quence of the breach."9 Over the past few years, there has been a
healthy international debate whether "loss" as defined under
CISG article 74 includes attorneys' fees and court costs."° The
source of this debate originated from conflicting rulings in the
case of Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking
Co., Inc. (Zapata).1
In 2001, U.S. District Court Judge Shadur, of the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, found "the normal unre-
strained reading of article 74... calls for Zapata's recovery of its
attorneys' fees as foreseen consequential damages." 2 In 2002,
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
the district court's opinion holding that "[tihere is no suggestion in
the background of the [CISGI or the cases under it that 'loss' was
intended to include attorneys' fees .... though certain pre-litiga-
tion legal expenditures.., would probably be covered as 'inciden-
tal' damages."13 Judge Posner also found the award of attorneys'
fees to be part of domestic procedural law, not a matter of substan-
tive treaty law.14
This Seventh Circuit opinion has been widely criticized for its
9. CISG, supra note 1, art. 74 (emphasis added). CISG article 74 is essentially a
verbatim restatement of article 82 of ULIS. See ULIS, supra note 3, art. 82.
10. Compare Harry M. Flechtner, Recovering ATTORNEYS' FEES as Damages Under
the U.N. Sales Convention: The Role of Case Law in New International Commercial
Practice, With Comments on Zapata Hermanos v. Hearthside Baking, 22 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 121 (2002) [hereinafter Flechtner, Recovering Attorneys' Fees] (supporting
the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Zapata), and Harry Flechtner & Joseph Lookofsky,
Viva Zapata! American Procedure and CISG Substance in a U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeal, 7 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 93 (2003) [hereinafter Flechtner &
Lookofsky], and Troy Keily, How Does the Cookie Crumble? Legal Costs Under a
Uniform Interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 2003 NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/keily2.html [hereinafter Keily], with John Felemegas,
An Interpretation of Article 74 CISG by the U.S. Court of Appeals, 15 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 91 (2003) [hereinafter Felemegas] (opposing the Seventh Circuit's ruling in
Zapata), and Jamo Vanto, Attorneys' Fees as Damages in International Commercial
Litigation, 15 PACE INT'L L. REV. 203 (2003), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cisglbiblio/vantol.html [hereinafter Vanto], and Bruno Zeller, Interpretation of Article
74 - Zapata Hermanos v. Hearthside Baking - Where Next?, 2004 NORDIC J. COM. L.
1, available at http://www.njcl.fi/l_2004/commentaryl.pdf [hereinafter Zeller].
11. See generally Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc.,
No. 99 C 4040, 2001 WL 1000927 (N.D. Ill Aug. 29, 2001) (awarding Zapata contract
damages); Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., No. 99 C
4040, 2002 WL 398521 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2002) (awarding attorneys' fees as
consequential damages under CISG article 74), rev'd, 313 F.3d 385 (7th Cir. 2002)
(overturning the award of attorneys' fees), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1068 (2003).
12. Zapata, 2001 WL 1000927, at *3.
13. Zapata, 313 F.3d at 388.
14. See id.
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lack of authority and questionable analysis of the CISG text. 5
Zapata has nevertheless become precedent in the Seventh Circuit,
binding lower courts to follow suit. This casenote intends to add
another voice to the chorus of those who disagree with Judge Pos-
ner's ruling in Zapata, and provide additional insight to this lin-
gering debate.
Section II examines the international rules for treaty inter-
pretation, a seemingly mysterious subject for many U.S. judges.
Section III reviews the CISG text, explores its drafting history,
and discusses its interpretation by courts of other CISG parties
and arbitral panels. Section IV returns to the Zapata case,
presenting the reasoning for both Judge Shadur's and Judge Pos-
ner's decisions. Lastly, section V discusses why Judge Posner
incorrectly interpreted the CISG and seemingly ignored the inter-
national rules of treaty interpretation. It also addresses how
Judge Posner's ruling in Zapata negatively affects other U.S.
courts. Lastly this note suggests appropriate alternative
approaches domestic judges could take to interpret the
Convention.
II. TREATY INTERPRETATION FRAMEWORK
There are two bodies of law that U.S. judges should consult
before passing judgment on treaty interpretation. The first, of
course, is the well-developed doctrine of the U.S. Constitution's
Supremacy Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The sec-
ond is the well-developed rule of treaty interpretation of interna-
tional law embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention), as well as decisions from the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (PCIJ).
A. Supremacy Clause and Treaty Interpretation
Under the U.S. Constitution
Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Constitution (the Supremacy
Clause) asserts that treaties are supreme federal law. 6 Since
1796, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that fed-
15. See Felemegas, supra note 10, at 99-128 (criticizing the Zapata decision for its
lack of authority and incorrect analysis); see also Flechtner & Lookofsky, supra note
10, §§ 5.1-5.7; Keily, supra note 10, at 10-13; Vanto, supra note 10, at 220-21; Zeller,
supra note 10, §§ 3-6.
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. ("The Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
408
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eral judges are bound to apply treaty law.1 7 Treaties, however, are
subject to the "last-in-time rule." This means that should a Legis-
lative act come after the ratification of the treaty, and the purpose
of the act was to clearly supersede the treaty, or if the act and the
earlier treaty provision cannot be fairly reconciled, the act will
overrule the treaty. s
Because self-executing treaties are supreme federal law and
presumably coequal with acts of Congress, they should trump
inconsistent judicially created federal procedural doctrine. 19
Seemingly, only a subsequent controlling Congressional act on
procedural rules could trump treaty law under the Constitution.2 °
Even in situations where judicially created procedural rules are
controlled by Congress and used to interpret a treaty, in view of
the Charming Betsy doctrine, these rules of procedure should be
interpreted consistently with international law.2 Thus, U.S.
courts should, almost reflexively, find that that treaty law over-
rides domestic procedural law. Yet, this is not always the case, as
illustrated in Zapata.
The issue of whether treaty law trumps judicially created pro-
cedural rules has been addressed recently in a number of cases
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land. . . .") (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1909);
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488 (1879); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. 366,
372 (1857); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410, 439 (1838); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515, 593 (1832); Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1809); United States
v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 237, 244,
261, 272 (1796); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1987).
18. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190 (1888); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 599 (1889); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115 (1987).
19. See Jordan J. Paust, Breard and Treaty-Based Rights Under the Consular
Convention, 92 AM. J. INT'L .L. 691, 692 (1998) (stating that self-executing treaties, as
supreme federal law, should trump inconsistent judicially created federal procedural
doctrines).
20. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) ("Congress has
undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may
exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make
rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United States ..
(citation omitted)).
21. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("[An act of
Congress ... can never be construed to violate [ I rights ... further than is warranted
by the law of nations .... ."); see also PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 107-
8 n.9; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 114 (1987).
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interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR),22 including cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and the
ICJ 3.2  On three separate occasions, the ICJ has ruled that the
United States has breached aliens' rights under the VCCR by
applying domestic procedural rules to deny the aliens' treaty
claims.2 ' The Supreme Court, despite the ICJ's holdings, has
ruled that the use of state procedural default rules to dismiss
treaty claims was Constitutionally sound.25
Recently, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to
readdress the issue. 26 The Supreme Court, however, subsequently
dismissed the writ as being improvidently granted following the
release of a Presidential memorandum that stated the United
States would discharge its international obligations under the ICJ
judgment by having state courts give effect to the decisions "in
accordance with general comity principles."27  Because the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to address this issue, in conjunc-
tion with the Presidential memorandum, the issue of whether
rights under the VCCR trump procedural default rules was raised
again in the Texas courts. Ultimately, however, the case was dis-
missed after the court concluded that the President's memoran-
dum violated the separation of powers doctrine by intruding into
22. See VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261.
23. See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (dismissing certiorari in
order for the Texas state court to consider an executive memorandum stating the U.S.
would comply with the ICJ's ruling in Avena); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998)
(denying a petition for a writ of certiorari by enforcing a procedural default against a
habeas petitioner's attempt to litigate a VCCR claim on the day of his scheduled
execution; holding that the treaty did not trump the procedural rules of the federal
courts); Commonwealth v. Diemer, 785 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (holding
VCCR article 36 does not supersede procedural default rules); Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31) (finding individual rights
under VCCR article 36 trump state procedural default rules); Lagrand Case (F.R.G. v.
U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) (finding individual rights under VCCR article 36
trump state procedural default rules); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Para. v. U.S.) 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov.10) (finding individual rights under VCCR article
36 trump state procedural default rules).
24. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar.
31); LAGRAND Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov.10).
25. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (holding that absent a clear and
express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum state govern the
implementation of a treaty in that state).
26. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661 (2005).
27. Id. at 663 (citing George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General
Regarding the Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of Justice in
Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/
20050228-18.html) (unpublished presidential memorandum)).
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the judiciary's domain. 2 Therefore, despite the rulings of the ICJ
and the determination of the U.S. President that treaty law
trumps state procedural law, there is still resistance by courts to
recognize or enforce such treaty rights.
B. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
The general principle of treaty interpretation is expressed by
the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat,29 meaning a treaty
should be interpreted to give effect to its object and purpose.
Often referred to as the rule of effectiveness, this principle has
been used when the meaning of the text is unclear, preferring the
interpretation that gives some effect to a provision over one that
does not.3 °
The rule of effectiveness is now embodied in article 31 of the
Vienna Convention.3 ' Although the United States is not a party to
the Vienna Convention, U.S. courts have found that article 31 is
an accurate restatement of the customary international law of
treaties. 32 The ICJ also consistently finds that the Vienna Con-
vention article 31 is an international custom.33 Article 31 states,
inter alia, that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose. 34
28. See Ex parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 WL 3302639, at *9 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). The case was heard on a successive application for writ of habeas corpus
to consider the Presidential memorandum's effect on the Texas state courts ruling in
the case. Id. at *2.
29. See Nat'l Pemberton Bank v. Lougee, 108 Mass. 371 (1871). Ut res magis
valeat quam pereat literally means "to give effect to the matter rather than having it
fail." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
30. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Corfu
Channel]. In Corfu, the ICJ stated that "[iut would indeed be incompatible with the
generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort
occurring in a special agreement should be devoid of purport or effect." Id. at 24.
31. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
32. See, e.g., MARIAN LLOYD NASH, DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INT'L LAW 703-705,
767, 769 (1979); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 707 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), affd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir.1973) (applying article 31 to interpretation of
Warsaw Convention); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); Denby v. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc., 575
F. Supp. 1134, 1138 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 737 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1984).
33. See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain),
1995 I.C.J. 6, 18 (Feb. 15).
34. Vienna Convention, supra note 31, art. 31.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:2
The International Law Commission's (ILC) commentary
regarding article 31 further supports the effectiveness principle of
treaty interpretation. The commentary notes that the ILC
[iun so far as the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat[,]
reflects a true general rule of interpretation, [which] is
embodied in [article 31] . . . . When a treaty is open to two
interpretations one of which does and the other does not
enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and
the objects and purpose of the treaty demand that the for-
mer interpretation should be adopted. 5
The ILC, therefore, clearly incorporated the effectiveness principle
into the text of article 31.36
Furthermore, along with article 32, article 31 of the Vienna
Convention provides that a treaty is generally to be interpreted
according to the four corners of the document. 7 Only in situations
where the text of the convention is not sufficiently clear should
outside materials be consulted .3  Article 32 provides for this lim-
ited availability to consult supplementary materials when the
plain meaning of the text "leaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure [or] ... leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable. 39
Lastly, and perhaps most relevant to the analysis of this case-
note, the Vienna Convention provides interpretive guidance for
domestic courts not to use domestic laws to interfere with treaty
obligations."° To this end, article 27 states that "[a] party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its fail-
ure to perform a treaty."41 Article 27 is consistent with the
Supremacy Clause, at least when treaties have not been super-
seded by a subsequent act of Congress.
Therefore, under the Vienna Convention, U.S. courts should
sit as if they are an international law tribunal when interpreting
the CISG. State and common law should be set aside when
approaching a question of international law, and the issue should
35. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, art. 28(6), U.N. Doc.
AICN.4/SER.A/1967/Add.1 (68.V.2) (1966).
36. See Corfu Channel, supra note 30, at 24.
37. See Vienna Convention, supra note 31, art. 31. In addition, article 1 states
that "[a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty."
38. See id. art. 32.
39. Id.




be determined by the plain language of the CISG.42 It is only
when the plain language of the text is ambiguous or would lead to
an unreasonable result that a court is to look to subsidiary means
of interpretation, such as the drafting history or interpretive case
law.
43
III. INTERPRETING WHAT CONSTITUTES "Loss"
UNDER ARTICLE 74
A. Treaty Provisions
When an international contract governed by the CISG is
breached, the adversely effected party, whether it is the buyer" or
seller, can seek remedies in the form of damages under articles
74 to 77. Article 74 sets out the general means of calculating
these damages where "[d]amages for breach of contract by one
party consist of a sum equal to the loss . . . suffered by the other
party as a consequence of the breach."46  This amount is reduced
by factors set out in the second sentence of article 74 and in article
77.47 Article 74 also provides that "Is]uch damages may not exceed
the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have fore-
seen at the time of the conclusion of the contract in the light of the
facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known,
as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.8 Article 77
reduces the allowable damages by requiring the injured party to
"take such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to
mitigate the[ir] loss."49
In summary, damages for breach of contract under the CISG
are calculated by including the total loss of the injured party as a
consequence of the breach, minus what was not foreseen or fore-
42. See Vienna Convention, supra note 31, arts. 27, 31.
43. See id. art. 32.
44. CISG, supra note 1, art. 45 ("If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations
under the contract or this Convention, the buyer may... claim damages as provided
in articles 74 to 77.").
45. CISG, supra note 1, art. 61 ("If the buyer fails to perform any of his obligations
under the contract or this Convention, the seller may ... claim damages as provided
in articles 74 to 77.").
46. Id. art. 74 (emphasis added).
47. See id. arts. 74, 77.
48. Id. art. 74 (emphasis added).
49. See id. art. 77 ("A party who relies on a breach of contract must take measures
as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit,
resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may
claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been
mitigated.").
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seeable by the breaching party, and minus what was not miti-
gated by the injured party. Note that articles 75 and 76 merely
modify the terms for calculating damages under article 74 in situ-
ations where the contract has been avoided ° and alternative
goods have been purchased,51 or where there have been a variation
in the market price between the time of the contract and time of
avoidance. Articles 75 and 76 address issues beyond the scope of
this casenote and are largely irrelevant in Zapata attorneys' fees
and cost situations.
B. The CISG's Internal Rules of Interpretation
In interpreting the meaning of "loss" in article 74, courts must
follow the CISG's internal rules of interpretation found in article
7.15 Article 7(1) requires that when interpreting the CISG, "regard
is to be had to its international character, and the need to promote
uniformity in its application, and the observance of good faith in
international trade."54 Article 7(2) additionally provides a three-
part test for how the treaty is to be interpreted.55 First, if a topic is
governed by the CISG, then courts look to the four corners of the
document to settle it. 6 Second, as a "gap-filling" measure, should
the CISG govern issues "which are not expressly settled in it... ,
recourse should be "in conformity with the general principles on
which [the CISG] is based."57 Third, in the absence of such princi-
50. CISG article 49 allows the buyer, and article 64 allows the seller, to avoid the
contract if there has been a failure in performance of the contract amounting to
"fundamental breach." Id. arts. 49 & 64. A fundamental breach is defined by article
25 which states that "[a] breach of a contract committed by one of the parties is
fundamental if it results in such a detriment to the other party as substantially to
deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, unless the party in
breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same
circumstances would not have foreseen such a result." Id. art. 25
51. Id. art. 75.
52. Id. art. 76.
53. Id. art. 7.
54. Id. art. 7(1).
55. See id. art. 7(2). ("Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general
principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with
the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.").
56. See id. This is based on the language that "matters governed by this
convention wich are not expressly settled in it." Id. Thus, if there is matter governed
by the convention that is expressly settled within the treaty, the text of the treaty
alone governs. See id.; see also Bruno Zeller, Four-Corners-The Methodology for
Interpretation and Application of the UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (May 2003), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
4corners.html.
57. Id. art. 7(2).
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ples, as a last resort, the issue is to be settled "in conformity with
the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international
law[,] "' s which is interpreted to stand for the choice of law of the
domestic forum.59
Professor Bruno Zeller has succinctly described the impor-
tance of article 7 for interpreting the CISG where he stated that
[the] legal theory on which the CISG relies is contained in
[A]rticle 7. Whether a domestic or an international law is
examined such an understanding is essential in order to
elicit the very purpose of the law in question. Only through
such an understanding will consistent and predictable out-
comes be achieved. The logical product of failure to achieve
uniformity besides a possible loss of confidence is a search
for the best solution resulting in 'forum shopping.'60
C. General Principles on Which the CISG is Based
The above internal rules for interpretation purport an impor-
tant question that must be answered. What are the general princi-
ples on which the CISG is based with regard to assigning
damages? The CISG commentary to article 74 and annotated text
of article 7 provides some insight to this question. The commen-
tary illustrates that article 74 suggests that the tern "sum equal
to the loss" incorporates the general principle of "full
compensation."
Article 74 is a basic rule defining the general extent of the
obligation to pay damages for all cases in which the Con-
vention provides for such an obligation. The rule that in
general both the loss suffered by the promisee and his loss
of profit are to be compensated expresses the principle of
full compensation: the promisee has a right to be fully com-
pensated for all disadvantages he suffers as a result of the
promisor's breach of contract.6
The Commentary adds that this principle of "full compensation" is
to be used in order to identify the losses which are to be
compensated.
58. Id.
59. See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 96-99 (3d ed. 1999).
60. Zeller, supra note 10, at 2 (citation omitted).
61. HANS STOLL & GEORG GRUBER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 553 (Peter Schlectriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer
eds., 1998) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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[T]he Convention provides for damages for loss, including
loss of profit, suffered as a consequence of a breach of con-
tract..., [but] does not define which losses are compensat-
able in greater detail. Compensability is therefore
determined by the general principle of full compensation
... taking into account the particular purpose of the con-
tract concerned.62
Presumably, under this general principle, "full compensation" for
damages includes compensation for losses incurred by a successful
plaintiff for their attorneys' fees as a result of the litigation. The
recovery of such losses, however, would be subject to the other
requirements of articles 74 and 77 in that losses must be foresee-
able and preventable losses mitigated."
Furthermore, the annotated text of CISG article 7 sets out a
number of general principles with regard to interpreting the
CISG.1 Of these general principles, the one that most directly
influences the interpretation of article 74 is the principle of unity,
which is expressed in article 7(1).6" Professor Honnold suggests
that where there is both a reasonable basis for resolving an issue
within the confines of the CISG, and a reasonable basis for resolv-
ing it by resort to domestic choice of law rules, a court should use
the unity principle to determine the issue without resorting to
domestic law.6 Professor Honnold has stated that:
Article 7(2), in calling for gap-filling through use of the
Convention's 'general principles,' avoids the intrusion of
diverse rules of domestic law. A corollary is the fact that
only development under the aegis of the Convention con-
tributes to the body of international jurisprudence and doc-
trine. . . . For example, let us assume that a question
"governed by the Convention" but not specifically solved by
its provisions is answered by recourse to private interna-
tional law and the domestic law of State A. This solution
will not be available when the question arises again and
rules of private international law point to the domestic law
62. Id. at 752.
63. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 74, 77.
64. ANNOTATED TEXT OF CISG: ARTICLE 7 WORDS AND PHRASES: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE CISG (Albert H. Kritzer, ed. 1999), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/
text/principles7.html [hereinafter ANNOTATED TEXT OF CISGI.
65. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1); see also ANNOTATED TEXT OF CISG, supra note
64, at the Unity Theme.
66. John 0. Honnold, Uniform Words and Uniform Application. The 1980 Sales
Convention and International Juridical Practice, in EINHEITLICHES KAUFRECHT UND
NATIONALES OBLIGATIONENRECHT 140 (Schlechtriem ed., 1987).
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of States B, C or D .... On the other hand, recourse to
"general principles" of the Convention will contribute to an
international body of case law that [] support[s] the Con-
vention's objective to unify the law.67
D. International Case Law
There are hundreds of international cases that have inter-
preted CISG article 74.68 The majority of these cases hold that
damages for losses should be decided in light of the general princi-
ple of full compensation. 69 Many of these cases also interpret arti-
cle 74 to include attorneys' fees as recoverable losses.7 ° Of those
cases that award attorneys' fees, however, it is uncertain where
the courts found authority to award these fees. Some awarded
attorneys' fees based only on article 74, while others award these
fees based both on article 74 and domestic law.71 Others still
award pre-trial attorneys' fees under article 74 and trial related
fees according to domestic law.72 Several arbitral tribunals have
also awarded recovery of attorneys' fees for the arbitration pro-
ceedings citing article 74.73 Furthermore, there were several cases
under ULIS interpreting article 82 to award attorneys' fees.74
This ambiguity whether the courts have the authority to
award attorneys' fees, either through CISG article 74 or domestic
"loser-pays" rules, lies at the center of the debate of the correct-
ness of Judge Posner's ruling in Zapata.75 For instance, some com-
mentators are of the opinion that attorneys' fees are governed by
article 74 and thus should be interpreted under the CISG exclu-
sively.76 Conversely, others are of the opinion that the CISG does
67. Id.
68. See Felemegas, supra note 10, at 130-147 (citing 276 cases that interpret CISG
article 74).
69. Id. at 98-99.
70. Id. at 104 n.27; see also Flechtner, Recovering Attorneys' Fees, supra note 10,
at 146-47.
71. See Felemegas, supra note 10, at 104-109 (providing detailed outlines of seven
international cases awarding attorneys' fees).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 109-111 (providing detailed outlines of two arbitration tribunals
awarding attorneys' fees).
74. Id. at 111-113 (providing detailed outlines of two international cases under
ULIS article 82 awarding attorneys' fees).
75. See Zeller, supra note 10.
76. Felemegas, supra note 10, at 128 ("If the proper interpretation of the [CISG]
entailed that attorneys' fees is foreseeable consequential loss that may be recovered
as damages for a breach of contract ... , then the 'hallowed American rule' could not
be used to trump the provision of the [CISGI.").
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not govern awards of attorneys' fees and therefore the award
should be granted under domestic procedural laws.77 This later
interpretation was apparently convincing to Judge Posner, even
though he did not cite any CISG scholars in his ruling.
IV. THE ZAPATA CASE
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. Zapata, a
Mexican seller of biscuit tins, sold its products to the Lenell
Cookie Company (Lenell), a U.S. corporation." This relationship
lasted for more than four years, until Lenell failed to pay Zapata
for a large number of tins. Zapata subsequently sued Lenell for
breach of contract in U.S. federal court, which was governed by
the CISG.79
A. The District Court Decision in Zapata
In 2001, the District Court awarded Zapata compensatory
contractual damages for the cost of unpaid tins delivered to
Lenell, as well as $550,000 in attorneys' fees. 0 Judge Shadur
found that "the normal restrained reading of article 74... calls for
Zapata's recovery of its attorneys' fees as foreseen consequential
damages."81 Judge Shadur reasoned that because fee-shifting
rules are substantive in nature, the award of fees is governed by
the CISG instead of domestic procedural rules. Because CISG
article 74 calls for uniformity of construction, and fee shifting is
mostly universal among commercial nations, the "make-whole"
expectation of Zapata is best achieved by conforming to Mexico's
own adherence to such fee-shifting rules. 3
B. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in
Zapata
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
77. Flechtner, Recovering Attorneys' Fees, supra note 10, at 158-59 (comparing
article 74's damages provision with general damages language in the UCC that have
"repeatedly been interpreted not to authorize recovery of damages for attorney fees").
78. See Zeller, supra note 10; see also Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v.
Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., No. 99 C 4040, 2002 WL 398521 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2002).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., No. 99 C
4040, 2001 WL 1000927, at *3 (N.D. Ill Aug. 29, 2001).
82. See id. at *2.
83. See id. at *4.
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Zapata's district court's decision.14 Judge Posner, who wrote the
opinion of the Seventh Circuit, found that legal fees were neither
clearly included, nor clearly excluded, from article 74 .5 The Sev-
enth Circuit found that "'loss' does not include attorneys' fees
incurred in the litigation of a suit for breach of contract, though
certain pre-litigation legal expenditures . . . would probably be
covered as 'incidental' damages."86 Yet, Judge Posner only cited to
domestic law and referred to "incidental" damages, a term specific
to the UCC, while CISG article 74 also contemplates "consequent-
ial" damages.
Judge Posner's reasoning was based primarily on three
grounds: 1) awards for attorneys' fees are not part of substantive
law, but are procedural rules to be determined by the local forum;
2) awards of attorneys' fees as consequential damages were not
contemplated in the four-corners of the CISG or in the general
principles on which the convention was based; and 3) interpreting
the CISG to include attorneys' fees in damage awards would cause
abnormalities in its application. Judge Posner reasoned that:
The [CISG] is about contracts, not about procedure. The
principles for determining when a losing party must reim-
burse the winner for the latter's expense of litigation are
usually not a part of a substantive body of law, such as con-
tract law, but a part of procedural law. For example, the
'American rule,' that the winner must bear his own litiga-
tion expenses, and the 'English rule' (followed in most other
countries as well), that he is entitled to reimbursement, are
rules of general applicability. They are not field-specific.
There are, it is true, numerous exceptions to the principle
that provisions regarding attorneys' fees are part of general
procedure law .... An international convention on contract
law could do the same. 7 But not only is the question of
attorneys' fees not 'expressly settled' in the [CISGI, it is not
even mentioned. And there are no 'principles' that can be
drawn out of the provisions of the [CISG] for determining
whether 'loss' includes attorneys' fees; so by the terms of
the Convention itself the matter must be left to domestic
law ....
The interpretation of 'loss' for which Zapata contends
84. Zapata Hermanos Sucesores S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co. Inc., 313 F.3d 385,
391-92 (7th Cir. 2002).
85. Id. at 388
86. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347, cmt. c (1981)).
87. Id.
2007] 419
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:2
would produce anomalies... On Zapata's view the prevail-
ing plaintiff in a suit under the [CISG] would... get his
attorneys' fees reimbursed more or less automatically ....
But what if the defendant won? Could he invoke the domes-
tic law, if as is likely other than in the United States that
law entitled either side that wins to reimbursement of his
fees by the loser? Well, if so, could the plaintiff waive his
right to attorneys' fees under the Convention in favor of
domestic law, which might be more or less generous than
Article 74, since Article 74 requires that any loss must, to
be recoverable, be foreseeable, which beyond some level
attorneys' fees, though reasonable ex post, might not be?
And how likely is it that the United States would have
signed the Convention had it thought that in doing so it
was abandoning the hallowed American rule? To the vast
majority of the signatories of the Convention, being nations
in which loser pays is the rule anyway, the question
whether 'loss' includes attorneys' fees would have held little
interest; there is no reason to suppose they thought about
the question at all."
V. DISCUSSION
Judge Posner's Zapata opinion has been universally criticized
for its lack of authority and incorrect analysis of the CISG. 9 Yet,
even some of Judge Posner's most vocal critics of the decision's
reasoning agree with its final outcome.90 This section will explore
this debate. First, it will discuss the reasons why many believe
the outcome of the case was correct, despite Judge Posner's alleg-
edly flawed reasoning. Second, it will set out reasons why Judge
Posner's decision in Zapata was in fact incorrect. Third, it will
discuss aspects of Judge Posner's decision that are universally
criticized.
A. Why Some Commentators Believe That Judge
Posner Was Right
There are two main reasons why some commentators support
Judge Posner's final decision in Zapata. First, they suggest that
the CISG does not govern the award of attorneys' fees. Therefore
there is no need to consult the gap-filling measures under article
7(2) to interpret its application. Second, and most notably, is the
88. Id. at 388-89.
89. See sources cited supra note 10.
90. See generally id.
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belief that procedural rules are general in their application and
should apply to both domestic and international cases.
To begin, some commentators agree with Judge Posner that
"loser-pays" (or fee shifting) countries did not consider the ques-
tion of whether attorneys' fees should be included in the CISG,
and therefore believe that the issue is not governed by the CISG at
all.91 On this point, some have criticized Judge Posner's decision
for even addressing the issue of "principles" of CISG article 7(2).
For example Professors Flechtner and Lookofsky, two of Judge
Posner's most ardent supporters, criticize the erroneous use of
article 7(2) by stating that:
[t]he seemingly 'technical' (yet, in terms of CISG precedent,
significant) problem with [Judge Posner's application of
gap-filling measures in article 7(2)] is that it leads to inter-
nal inconsistency. If Judge Posner, on the one hand, deter-
mines . . . that the [CISG] is about contracts, not about
procedure, and.., that there is no reason to suppose that
any of those who drafted the [CISGI even thought about the
fee-shifting question, then how can he logically maintain
... that the vary same fee-shifting question is governed by
the [CISG] at all?92
Other commentators have expressed agreement with Profes-
sor Flechtner's opinion that procedural rules are general in their
application and should apply to both domestic and international
cases.93 To support this assertion, Professor Flechtner cites multi-
ple international cases where domestic procedural rules were
either the sole reason or a supporting reason cited for awarding
attorneys' fees.94 He concluded that while no international case
affirmatively rejected the idea of awarding CISG damages to cover
attorney costs, the prevailing practice in "loser-pays" countries
was to award attorneys' fees based on procedural rules. 95 Thus, in
order to insure uniform application of the CISG, each country
should "uniformly" use their procedural rules in applying article
74.96
91. See Flechtner & Lookofsky, supra note 10, at 101; Keily, supra note 10, at 18.
92. Flechtner & Lookofsky, supra note 10, at 101.
93. See Flechtner, Recovering Attorneys' Fees, supra note 10, at 134-46; Flechtner
& Lookofsky, supra note 10, at 97; see also Keily, supra note 10, at 18.
94. See Flechtner, Recovering Attorneys' Fees, supra note 10, 127-133.
95. Id. at 147.
96. Id. at 150.
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B. Why Judge Posner Was Wrong
Professor Felemegas argued that "[t]he [Seventh Circuit] paid
no attention to the plain language of the CISG, failed to refer to
international doctrine and jurisprudence, offered no analysis of
the general principles of the [CISG], and exhibited a clear prefer-
ence for the domestic classification and solution of the issue at
stake."97 This section will follow up on this assertion by setting
out five reasons why the case was determined incorrectly.
First, Judge Posner disregarded the international character
of the CISG by ignoring international doctrine and case law, and
by not consulting international rules of treaty interpretation. Sec-
ond, the plain language of article 74 contemplates the inclusion of
attorneys' fees in the calculation of loss. Third, Judge Posner
ignored the CISG's general principle of "full compensation" for
contract damages. Fourth, Judge Posner's distinction between
substantive and procedural law was inappropriate. Fifth, Judge
Posner's suggestion that awarding attorneys' fees would cause
"abnormalities" was irrelevant to the case he was addressing and
even if it was relevant, it could easily be disposed of under existing
rules of interpretation.
1. Disregard for the CISG's International Character
As stated supra, CISG article 7(1) states that when interpret-
ing the CISG, "regard is to be had to its international character
and to the need to promote uniformity in its application.""8
Despite this mandate, Judge Posner's interpretation of article 74
has been criticized for not citing any CISG authority, interna-
tional or domestic, which could have aided him to promote uni-
formity in the interpretation of the CISG.99 Judge Posner also
opined that when the CISG was drafted, "loser-pays" countries
had not contemplated awarding attorneys' fees as loss under arti-
cle 74.10 Considering the numerous cases addressing attorneys'
fees as "loss" under CISG article 74 in fee-shifting countries, how-
ever, it seems that these countries did, in fact, have a significant
amount of interest in the subject.01 Judge Posner may have had a
different opinion on the subject if he had consulted international
cases or commentary before making his decision. Because his
97. Felemegas, supra note 10, at 128.
98. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
99. See Flechtner & Lookofsky, supra note 10, at 102.
100. Id.
101. See Vanto, supra note 10, at 221.
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opinion made no attempted to promote a uniform application of
the CISG, some have suggested that methodologically it was a
step backward from other CISG opinions that attempt to enlist
the aid of commentary and decisions from beyond the tribunal's
jurisdiction to promote uniformity. °2
Furthermore, the ruling neglected to reference the principles
of construction appropriate to an international convention. °3
Judge Posner's reference to principles of domestic law, particu-
larly his reference to "incidental" damages found in the UCC but
not the CISG, opens his decision to criticism that the court had a
reflexive, or possibly unconscious, domestic legal bias.' For
instance, Professor Zeller suggests Judge Posner's ruling contrib-
utes to a homeward trend in interpreting the CISG, moving U.S.
CISG jurisprudence away from a perspective that transcends
domestic ideology.'015 Zeller provides an instructive example of
how a domestic court should interpret a treaty by citing the Aus-
tralian Supreme Court of Victoria's interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention in Povey.106 There, the Australian court made three
important observations about the method of constructing interna-
tional conventions, which could be used as a template by U.S.
domestic courts.
First [the Court] noted that it must be 'constructed by ref-
erence to the principles of construction appropriate to the
international convention.' Secondly these principles of con-
struction can be found in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties and thirdly foreign jurisprudence of an
appropriate court is highly persuasive if no jurisprudence is
available in [the domestic jurisdiction] .1°
Thus, it seems apparent that Judge Posner's familiarity with
U.S. law and legal interpretive frameworks appears to have inap-
propriately distracted him from the international rules of treaty
interpretation which prohibit internal laws as being justification
for failure to enforce an international instrument such as the
102. See Flechtner & Lookofsky, supra note 10, at 102.
103. See discussion supra Part II.B.
104. See Felemegas, supra note 10, at 118 ("[T]he Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Zapata, like a modern-day Procrustes, may be trying to fit the body of law
that is the CISG onto the bed that is American legal heritage which, by design, does
not fit.").
105. See Zeller, supra note 10.
106. Id. (citing Povey v. Civil Aviation Safety Auth. & Ors. (2002) VSC 580 (20
December 2002)).
107. See Zeller, supra note 10 (citing CISG, supra note 1, art. 7).
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CISG in domestic courts.'
2. Article 74 Contemplates the Inclusion of Attorneys'
Fees
Judge Posner stated "not only is the question of attorneys'
fees not "expressly settled" in the [CISG], it is not even men-
tioned." °9 This is likely an incorrect and possibly disingenuous
reading of article 74. The plain language of article 74 arguably
contemplates the inclusion of attorneys' fees in the calculation of
loss. "The nature of [a]rticle 74 is inclusive, not exhaustive."110
There are many different categories of loss recoverable as dam-
ages, none of which is specifically mentioned in the text of article
74."' If attorneys' fees can be removed from the article 74's cover-
age, then so could all other forms of damages except lost profits,
the only specific form of damages mentioned. 1 2 The voluminous
case law on article 74 documents this fact.113 Therefore, it is sus-
pect for Judge Posner to have singled out one non-specific category
of loss when the general approach of CISG article 74 is not to spe-
cifically mention any of the categories of loss encompassed by its
express language.1
4
3. The Ignored CISG General Principle of Full
Compensation
Judge Posner found that there were no principles that could
be drawn out of the provisions of the CISG to suggest "loss"
included attorneys' fees."5 The problem with this decision, how-
ever, is that there is overwhelming evidence to show that article
74 is based on the general principle of "full compensation."" 6 The
commentaries of both the CISG and ULIS, as well as over two-
hundred cases on the subject, directly support the fact that CISG
article 74 is based on the general principle of "full compensa-
tion.""' 7 There are also eleven cases that interpret the CISG arti-
108. See Vienna Convention, supra note 31, art. 27.
109. Zapata Hermanos Sucesores S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co. Inc., 313 F.3d 385,
388 (7th Cir. 2002).
110. Felemegas, supra note 10.
111. See id.
112. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
113. See Felemegas, supra note 10, at 120.
114. Id. at 117.
115. Zapata, 313 F.3d at 389.
116. See Felemegas, supra note 10, at 98-99.
117. Id. at 120.
424
2007] QUE LASTIMA ZAPATA 425
cle 74 or ULIS article 82 that specifically included attorneys' fees
in the calculation of loss.' The CISG's general principles can also
be found in the lex mercatoria, which appear in such documents as
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts..9 and the Principles of European Contract Law. 2 ° Both
article 7.42 of the UNIDROIT principles and article 9:502 of the
Principles of European Contract Law confirm, by analogy, that
"full compensation" is a general principle of the CISG.' 2'
Furthermore, the principle of full compensation has become a
principle of customary international law. In 1928, the PCIJ found
this to be the case in the Chorzow Factory Case, a case where
Poland was found to have breached contractual rights of German
citizens.'22 There the PCIJ made a commonly quoted ruling on the
international law of damages. It stated that "[r]eparation must,
as far as possible, wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed."2 ' Being that custom-
ary international law is also U.S. law, there would be no domestic
prohibition to apply the general principle of full compensation in
U.S. courts.
24
Therefore, if legal fees are not clearly included, but also not
clearly excluded, from article 74 as Judge Posner suggests, then
the only solution would be to apply article 7(2) to determine
whether a gap exists.'25 If a gap does exist, the court is first obli-
118. Id. at 99-103.
119. UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commercial Contracts, INT'L INST. FOR
THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (1994), http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/
main.htm.
120. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAw PARTS I AND II (0. Lando & H. Beale
eds., 2000).
121. Zeller, supra note 10, at 5.
122. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 13 (Sept. 13).
123. Id. at 21.
124. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In Paquete Habana, Justice
Gray provided a foundational framework of for determining customary international
law. The Court stated that "[i]nternational law is part of [American] law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators
who by years of labor, research and experience have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is." Id. at 700.
125. See discussion supra Part III.B; see also CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
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gated to attempt to settle the matter through the general princi-
ples on which the CISG is based. 12 6 Thus, under this reasoning,
Judge Posner was required to determine whether the CISG gen-
eral principle of "full compensation" included attorneys' fees.
Arguably, the weight of academic writing and past cases suggests
that it does.
4. Inappropriate Distinction Between Substantive and
Procedural Law
Judge Posner's most persuasive argument in Zapata was that
the CISG "is about contracts not procedure," and that "principles
for determining when a losing party must reimburse the winner
for the latter's expense of litigation are usually ... part of proce-
dural law."127 Unfortunately, his decision does not provide any
authority to substantiate the decision. It was presumably based
on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in MCC-Marble v. Ceramica,12
8
which found that CISG article 8(3) trumped the domestic parole
evidence rule based on the fact that it was a substantive rule, as
opposed to a procedural rule, of evidence. 129 Nevertheless, by mak-
ing such claims, Judge Posner confused domestic law with inter-
national law. The appropriate question was not whether
attorneys' fees are part of procedural or substantive law in domes-
tic setting but whether attorneys' fees are part of a foreseeable
expense pursuant to article 74.
Professor Honnold has suggested, when noting "labels that
the state law bears should be irrelevant" under international law,
that the problem with Judge Posner's argument is that the domes-
tic label of "procedural law" distorts the application of article 7(1),
which calls for the uniform application of the CISG.' 30 Professor
Orlandi argues that when parties from different countries with
different legal heritages turn to the courts for equal enforcement
of their contractual rights pursuant to the uniform rules of the
CISG, "abstract distinctions between substantive and procedural
126. See CISG, supra note 1, art. (7)(2).
127. Zapata Hermanos Sucesores S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co. Inc., 313 F.3d 385,
388 (7th Cir. 2002).
128. MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nouva D'Agostino, S.P.A., 144
F.3d 1384 (l1th Cir. 1998)
129. Id. at 1388-1389.
130. John 0. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales; The 1980 United
Nations Convention, in 18 ASIAN PAC. REGIONAL TRADE LAW SEMINAR 181, 195 (1984);
see also Zeller, supra note 10, at 8.
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laws become redundant, if not harmful .... 131
Furthermore, even if attorneys' fees were an aspect of proce-
dural law, they are so closely connected with the substantive issue
of damages under international law that it is not possible to sepa-
rate the two. 132 This is particularly evident based on the view that
in the vast majority of the CISG's member states, the procedural
laws regarding the award of attorneys' fees are uniform, with the
"American rule" being in the exception. 133 Thus, maintaining an
artificial distinction to deny the recovery of attorneys fees based
on procedural rules violates CISG article 7(1)'s mandate of uni-
form interpretation.
3 4
5. Awarding Attorneys' Fees Would Not Cause
"Abnormalities"
Lastly, Judge Posner argued that if CISG article 74 were to be
interpreted to contemplate attorneys' fees it would create "abnor-
malities."13 These abnormalities, as argued by the Court, would
occur in the CISG application where a victorious defendant would
not be able to invoke the same relief against a plaintiff since arti-
cle 74 only contemplates damages for a breach of contract. 136 Pre-
sumably, the loosing plaintiff in such a case would not have
breached the contract to trigger article 74. This abnormities argu-
ment, however, suffers from many problems, the most glaring of
which is that it is a hypothetical situation that had no relevance to
the facts of the case.
137
Even if the abnormalities argument was relevant, critics sug-
gest that it can easily be disposed of in one of two ways. First, in
such a situation as Judge Posner's hypothetical, the plaintiff could
be found to have breached contract by bringing a non-meritorious
claim in violation of the duty of good faith in international trade
under article 7(1). 13" Thus, the defendant would be entitled to col-
lect damages under article 74. Alternatively, if the plaintiff is
131. Chiara Giovannucci Orlandi, Procedural Law Issues and Law Conventions, 1
UNIF. L. REV. 25 (2000); see also Zeller, supra note 10, at 8.
132. Zeller, supra note 10, at 9.
133. For discussion on varying rules in different countries see John Gotonda,
Awarding Costs and Attorneys' Fees in International Commercial Arbitrations, 21
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997).
134. Zeller, supra note 10, at 9.
135. Zapata Hermanos Sucesores S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., 313 F.3d 385,
388-89 (7th Cir. 2002).
136. CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
137. See Zeller, supra note 10, at 9.
138. See Felemegas, supra note 10, at 127.
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found not to have breached the contract, because it is not a situa-
tion contemplated under the CISG, then it should be dealt with
under the gap-filling rules of article 7(2) based on general princi-
ples or domestic choice of laws rules.139
C. Consensus Interpretation of Article 74
Regardless whether scholars are supporters or opponents of
Judge Posner's opinion, they all agree on three things. First, that
Judge Posner did not follow the rules of analysis of CISG article 7.
Though some supporters believe that attorneys' fees are not gov-
erned by the CISG, and the opponents believe that they are, both
sides agree that Judge Posner misapplied the rules of article 7.
Second, though somewhat related to the first, both sides agree
that Judge Posner was careless in not attempting to analyze the
general principle of the CISG. If attorneys' fees are governed by
the CISG, then there is an abundance of authority to suggest the
general principle of full compensation would apply, leading to the
conclusion that attorneys' fees should be included in loss. Third,
both sides agree that Judge Posner improperly cited exclusively to
U.S. cases and completely ignored caselaw from other CISG state
parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Posner's ruling in Zapata has led U.S. courts to inter-
pret CISG article 74 to exclude awards for attorneys' fees merely
by applying stare decisis, as opposed to actually interpreting the
treaty itself. Soon after the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Zapata,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, East-
ern District, granted summary judgment on the issue of attorneys'
fees in Ajax Tool Works.141 It reasoned that "[a] claim for attor-
neys' fees is a procedural matter governed by the law of the forum.
As the Seventh Circuit recently held, "loss" in article 74 does not
include attorneys' fees.' "141
Most recently, in Chicago Prime Packers,'42 the U.S. District
139. See Zeller, supra note 10, at 10.
140. Ajax Tool Works, Inc., v. Can-Eng Mfg. Ltd., No. 01 C 5938, 2003 WL 223187,
at *7 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 30, 2003) (granting for summary judgment denying attorneys'
fees).
141. Id. at 7 (citing Zapata Hermanos Sucesores S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co. Inc.,
313 F.3d 385, 388-89 (7th Cir. 2002)).




Court for the Northern District of Illinois also refused to consider
the issue of attorneys' fees under the CISG stating that "[a] claim
for attorneys' fees is a procedural matter governed by the law of
the forum. The Seventh Circuit recently decided that the term
'loss' in article 74 of the CISG does not include attorneys' fees
incurred in the litigation of a suit for breach of contract."
1 43
Fortunately, the infectious decision of Zapata has been con-
tained within the Seventh Circuit. However, this is likely because
no other circuits have faced this precise issue. Hopefully, before
other U.S. courts blindly follow the Seventh Circuit's misguided
decision, they will consider the rules of international treaty inter-
pretation, take into consideration the case law from sister state
parties to the CISG and the magnitude of criticism by noted schol-
ars that followed the Zapata decision.
In addition, U.S. courts should consider the effect that diver-
gent jurisdictional positions on awarding attorneys' fees have on
forum selection. It is reasonable to presume that international
disharmony in interpreting damages under the CISG will lead to
forum shopping in contract actions. Furthermore, considering the
costs of international litigation regarding domestic and foreign
attorneys' fees, the Zapata precedent could produce a chilling
effect on foreign corporation's decision to bring CISG claims in
U.S. courts. Today, at least in the Seventh Circuit, foreign corpo-
rations do not get full compensation from U.S. companies that
breach its contract. Looking forward, courts in other U.S. Circuits
should have the wisdom not to make the same mistakes as the
Seventh Circuit. Que Lastima Zapata!
143. Id. at 717 (citing Zapata Hermanos Sucesores S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co.
Inc., 313 F.3d 385, 388-89 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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